Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Status Preference : asymmetric motivations for status by Hatta, Yutaro
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Status 
Preference: asymmetric motivations for status 
 
Yutaro Hatta 
 
 
Discussion Paper 13-08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Status 
Preference: asymmetric motivations for status 
 
Yutaro Hatta 
 
 
Discussion Paper 13-08 
Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Status
Preference: asymmetric motivations for status
Yutaro Hattay
Abstract
This paper explores the implications of status-seeking behavior in wealth
for economic dynamics. I move away from the conventional setup of status
preference. That is, individuals with higher wealth behave dierently as
compared to those with lower wealth; agents with dierent wealth have
asymmetric motivations for social status: mathematically, there is a kink in
status utility, which is empirically suggested. The main results are as follows:
the stability of the equal steady state in an economy is determined by which
agents have higher motivations for status. Depending on parameter values,
whether inequality may diminish or persist is determined. Inequality and
output are intricately related, due to asymmetric motivations.
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1 Introduction
There is much empirical support for the \relative utility hypothesis," which em-
phasizes that an individual's relative position in the society should play an im-
portant role in determining life satisfaction. Individuals care about not only the
absolute level but also the relative level of various economic variables including
consumption, human capital, wealth, and so on. Each paper adopts a dierent
motivation for status along with each research interest. There are two main ways
to incorporate status concern. Rauscher (1997), Fisher and Hof (2000), Liu and
Turnovsky (2005), Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008) examine the implica-
tions of consumption externalities for macroeconomic dynamics. On the other
hand, the approach adopted by Futagami and Shibata (1998), Kawamoto (2009)
and Long and Shimomura (2004) view wealth accumulation to be motivation for
status.1
In this paper, I investigate the implications of status-seeking behavior in wealth.
In particular, a kind of asymmetry is assumed in status preference, that is, indi-
viduals with higher wealth than the mean of social wealth behave dierently as
compared to those with lower wealth. Barnett et al. (2010) deal with this sit-
uation in a static model. In their model, individuals with heterogeneous-ability
feel status-derived satisfaction from consumption. Furthermore, the status utility
pays a utility premium if consumption exceeds the social mean. Hence, the status
utility exhibits a kink at a particular point. In other words, the utility function is
not concave over the domain and is convex for some interval. Therefore, it paves
a road to risk prone consumers. In fact, their paper investigates the relationship
between ex ante ability distribution and ex post income distribution. This paper
goes along with their paper, but examines the implications of such a setting in a
dynamic situation.
Empirical studies also support the asymmetric specication of status utility.
Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) estimate the status utility function of relative income,
using the German Socio Economic Panel. They nd that the status utility function
exhibits a kink at the average income, but the \direction" of the kink is somewhat
dierent from the way Barnett et al. specify. Specically, those with lower income
have higher marginal utility of relative income and vice versa. Therefore, the
function is entirely concave.
Along with status preference, one of the important topics in economics is capital
accumulation, since the feature of status-seeking behavior in wealth seems to play
a role in dynamic decisions and aects capital accumulation. This is what the
present paper deals with. Furthermore, I investigate how inequality evolves in an
economy and how it aects the economy as a whole.
I model an economy that consists of two types of agents. The dierence be-
tween the two is only in terms of initial asset holdings. My main results can be
1Much has been written about wealth accumulation as a source of motivation for social status.
Corneo and Jeanne (2001) show that status seeking behavior can be an engine of long-run growth,
even when there is no other engine such as technological spillover. Moreover, status preference
of wealth can support a balanced growth path on which, even if agents with dierent subjective
discount rates coexist, each agent holds a positive portion of the world's wealth (Futagami and
Shibata (1998)). Their results are in contrast to preceding literature which shows that the most
patient agent eventually holds all of the world's assets in a steady state (Becker (1980)).
2
summarized as follows. The utility premium in status utility, as in Barnett et al.
(2010), results in the instability of the equal steady state. It is seen that an econ-
omy goes to an unequal steady state. On the other hand, in Vendrik and Woltjer
(2007), the equal steady state is stable and an economy is likely to converge toward
it.
There exists some literature discussing the dynamics of wealth distribution
in the status preference model. Kawamoto (2009) investigates the status-seeking
behavior of relative income and focuses on attitudes of individuals to change in
reference income. If the marginal utility of individual's own income rises as the
average income rises, her preference is called KUJ (keeping up with the Joneses). If
the opposite is the case, I call it RAJ (running away from the Joneses). Kawamoto
(2009) shows that income inequality diminishes in a KUJ economy, with any level
of initial inequality. In contrast, in an RAJ economy, inequality expands, as long
as initial endowments are dierent across agents. Using an innitely lived agents
model, Long and Shimomura (2004) show that the poor will catch up with the
rich if the elasticity of the marginal utility of relative wealth is greater than the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. Kawamoto (2009) and Long
and Shimomura (2004) specify the conditions under which an economy goes to a
totally equal state or an unequal one; this paper does the same. However, these two
works emphasize dierent aspect of status utility. Furthermore, previous literature
expects an extreme situation in the long run: either all agents reach the same
circumstances or some agents hold all of the world assets. In this paper, the latter
case does not occur.
The connection between inequality and economic development is generally per-
ceived as the interaction between the two: one aects the other. In this sense,
this paper also relates to the studies investigating how output and inequality are
jointly determined. Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) construct an endoge-
nous growth model and examine the relationship between growth rate and income
distribution. They nd that a higher growth tends to be associated with a more
unequal economy. Therefore they predict a positive relationship between growth
and inequality. This paper shows that the relationship between the two variables
relies heavily on the nature of status preference, as does the evolution of inequal-
ity. In some cases, when inequality is low, the relationship between inequality and
output emerges as a positive correlation; when it is high, a negative correlation
arises. In other cases, it may be entirely positive, regardless of the level of inequal-
ity. Because both possibilities, positive or negative correlation, are suggested by
empirical evidences, this paper can explain both cases.2 3 Garcia-Penalosa and
Turnovsky (2008) examine the implication of status seeking behavior in consump-
tion, using a model with innitely-lived heterogeneous agents. In their model, the
long-run output is independent of the nature of status preference, unlike with this
2For example, Barro (2000) shows that inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries
and enhance growth in rich ones, however Forbes (2000) suggests that more income inequality is
associated with higher growth rate.
3The theoretic relationship is also controversial. Corneo and Jeanne (2001) uses a model
where individuals care about consumption and their rank in the distribution of wealth, and
show that more inequality results in higher growth rate. However, Peng (2008) makes a slight
change to Corneo and Jeanne model to show that the reversed relation would appear. Corneo
and Jeanne (1998), and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) point out that whether inequality fosters
growth depends on when individuals are concerned with their status.
3
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Fig. 1: Status utility function
paper. Hence, in their paper, status preference for consumption only aects the
transition path to the steady state.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model. Sections 3 and 4 show the dynamics of inequality in an economy. In
section 5, I investigate capital accumulation in the model and see the eect of the
redistribution policy. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a nonoverlapping generations economy with a continuum of population
of mass of 1. The economy is populated by two groups with dierent levels of
initial asset holdings. I use H and L to denote households with higher and lower
initial assets, respectively. The share of each group is half. Each household has
the same utility function so that the only dierence is asset holdings. Households
have one unit of labor and exogenously supply to the production sector. Moreover,
each household has an asset inheriting from parents as bequest. There is a single
good in this economy and I assume that a single good can be either consumed or
bequeathed to the ospring. Bequests are used as capital inputs for production
in the subsequent generation. I do not consider population growth so that the
population in the economy is constant over time.
2.1 Households
Agents derive utility from their own consumption and bequest for their children.
However, utility from bequest is derived by a status seeking motive, that is, bequest
gives satisfaction to agents in comparison to bequests made by others. Although
it seems odd that agents seek status through bequeathing, I can interpret it as
status-seeking behavior in wealth. The status utility of a household comes from
wealth, as compared to the wealth of others. When an agent leaves the economy,
his child comes to be the wealth holder.4
The utility function of an agent in generation t is given by
4Mitsopoulos (2009) also uses the model in which agents seek status in bequeathing.
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U it = u(c
i
t) + v(b
i
t+1=
bt+1)
=
(
log cit + 1
(bit+1=
bt+1)1  1
1  for b
i
t+1  bt+1
log cit + 2
(bit+1=
bt+1)1  1
1  for b
i
t+1 <
bt+1
: (1)
The rst term u(cit) represents the utility derived by consuming goods of c
i
t.
I assume that utility from consumption takes the logarithmic form. The second
term v(bit+1=
bt+1) represents the utility derived by giving bequest to the ospring.
The bequest of agent i is indicated by bit+1 and the average bequest is given by
bt+1. Therefore, agents feel satisfaction by giving bequests in comparison to social
average.
As shown in Figure 1, depending on whether 1 is larger than 2 or not, a kink
may arise in status utility. When 1 > 2, the shape of v() is the same as what
Barnett et al. (2010) assume in a static model. In this case, I can interpret that
the wealth exceeding the social average pays a utility premium. Barnett et al.
(2010) refer to this specication as an option that individuals can choose whether
to participate in the rat race or not. On the other hand, when 1 < 2, the
function is concave on the entire domain. Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) estimates
the status utility function of relative income, using the German Socio Economic
Panel. They nd that the status utility function exhibits a kink at the average
income in this way.
The parameter  captures the property of status preference. When  > 1, the
cross derivative of v() is positive, which means that as the social average rises the
incentive to bequest increases. This characteristic of status preference is called
KUJ. When  < 1, an increase in social average depresses individuals' motive to
bequest. This type of preference is named RAJ.
Households earn income from their exogenous supply of labor and renting their
bequests to rms as capital inputs. Therefore, they have the following budget
constraint:
cit + b
i
t+1  wt + (1 + rt)bit; (2)
where wt and rt denote labor income and the rental rate of capital at time t,
respectively.
Agents allocate their income into consumption and bequest so as to maximize
U it subject to budget constraint (2), given the level of average bequest
bt+1.
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The rst-order condition for the optimization problem of high-type agents is
obtained as follows:6
  1
wt + (1 + rt)bit   bit+1
+
1
bt+1

bit+1
bt+1
 
= 0:
Rearranging the terms, I get
wt + (1 + rt)b
i
t =
bt+1
"
bit+1
bt+1
+
1
1

bit+1
bt+1
#
: (3)
5It can be shown that low-type agents do not take over high-type agents in equilibrium
(bLt+1 < b
H
t+1).
6A similar condition is obtained for low-type agents.
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2.2 Production
There is a continuum of rms with measure one. Under a perfectly competitive en-
vironment, they produce nal goods, using labor and capital as inputs, according
to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale technology. For simplicity, the produc-
tion function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form.
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t :
Given the wage rate and the rate of return to capital, rms at time t choose the
level of employment of capital, Kt, and labor, Lt. The rm's prot maximization
implies that the marginal productivities of inputs are equalized to their marginal
costs:
wt = (1  )AKt ; (4)
1 + rt = AK
 1
t : (5)
I use the fact that each agent's exogenous labor supply equals one and that
the population size is one and constant over time. I also assume that there is full
capital depreciation.
2.3 Equilibrium and Dynamics
Since bequests at time t are used as inputs in production, the following capital
market condition holds.
Kt = bt: (6)
Since both types of agents (L and H) have an equal share in the population,
in an equilibrium,
bt =
1
2
(bHt + b
L
t ); (7)
is satised. Combining equations, (3),(4), (5), (6), and (7), yields
8>><>>:
A
2
b 1t [(1 + )b
H
t + (1  )bLt ] = bt+1

bHt+1
bt+1
+ 1
1

bHt+1
bt+1

A
2
b 1t [(1  )bHt + (1 + )bLt ] = bt+1

bLt+1
bt+1
+ 1
2

bLt+1
bt+1
 : (8)
Now, dene yt  b
H
t
bt
, which indicates the relative richness of high-type agents
at time t.
Furthermore, the following equation is derived;
bLt
bt
= 2  b
H
t
bt
= 2  yt: (9)
Using (8) for both types, the following equations backwardly determine the
dynamics of yt;
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Fig. 2: Stability of the equal steady state: stable (left), unstable (right)
yt =
1 

(1  (yt+1)) + 2
1 + (yt+1)
 	(yt+1); (10)
where (yt+1) =
2  yt+1 +  12 (2  yt+1)
yt+1 + 
 1
1 (yt+1)

: (11)
In what follows, I investigate the properties of the above dynamic system in
which yt is the only variable.
3 Symmetric Case
3.1 Dynamic Systems
In this section, I assume that the parameters in utility function are symmetric,
that is, 1 = 2 =  holds. It can be easily veried that 	() is increasing in yt+1
and that 	(1) = 1 and 	(2) = 1

+ 1 > 2 hold. As a result, the dynamics of
inequality, yt, can be described as in Figure 2. Further, note that
	0(1) =
1 +  1
(1 +  1)
: (12)
Therefore, I can say that the gradient of 	(yt+1) at yt+1 = 1 is greater than
1, if and only if  +  > ( + 1).7 Under this condition, the steady state in
which agents of both types hold equal amounts of assets is stable (Figure 2 (left)).
Otherwise, the no-inequality steady state is unstable, and I have a steady state
in which inequality between the high-type and low-type agents remains over time
(point A in Figure 2 (right)).
3.2 Comparative Dynamics
Now, I turn to the response of an economy to changes in the parameter values.
7Note that  > 1 is a sucient condition for a stable equal steady state. In other words, if
all agents are KUJ, then an equal steady state must be stable.
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@yt
@
=
 1
(1 + (yt+1))2
2

@(yt+1)
@
> 0: (13)
The change in the strength of status preference, , causes the graph to shift up.
Hence, an economy with a higher status preference tends to become equal quickly.8
Intuitively, when  increases, both types of individuals have more incentive to
accumulate wealth. However, the incentive of low-type agents generally exceeds
that of high-type agents, hence lowering inequality:
@yt
@
=
 1
(1 + (yt+1))2
2

@(yt+1)
@
> 0: (14)
Recall that the parameter  indicates the attitude to change in reference wealth.
In particular, when  > 1, individuals are KUJ. When  < 1, they are RAJ. As
 increases, the marginal utility of wealth, in response to a change in the average
wealth, increases. This triggers the interaction between the two types of agents
through status seeking, and thus pushes toward equality:
@yt
@
=   1
2
1  (yt+1)
1 + (yt+1)
< 0: (15)
A rise in capital share shifts the graph down. This is because capital share in-
dicates the strength of intergenerational inheritance, and thus of inequality within
generations. This implies that inequality in some generation is more likely to
remain in subsequent generations.
4 Asymmetric Case
In this section, I analyze dynamic systems when the status utility parameters may
dier:
yt =
1 

(1  (yt+1)) + 2
1 + (yt+1)
 	(yt+1; 1; 2; ); (16)
(yt+1; 1; 2; ) =
2  yt+1 +  11 (2  yt+1)
yt+1 + 
 1
2 (yt+1)

: (17)
There are three parameters 1; 2;  in the dynamic system and various dy-
namics may arise. However, the following argument suggests that an important
implication is obtained stemming from a kink in status preference. Whether
	(1; 1; 2; ) is larger or smaller than unity determines the stability of the equal
steady state: when 1 < 2, the equal steady state is stable; alternatively when
1 > 2, it is unstable (see Figure 3). In other words, as Barnett et al. (2010) sug-
gest, when there is a utility premium in status (1 > 2), low-type agents can never
catch up with high-type agents (see the left panel of Figure 3). Intuitively, when
there is a utility premium, high-type agents try to go beyond the average to obtain
the utility premium. Although low-type agents also like to do so, advantageous
8If the unequal steady state is stable, inequality is lower in the steady state.
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Fig. 3: Left: 1 > 2; Right: 1 < 2
agents inhibit them. On the other hand, if I stand on the empirical suggestion by
Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), the equal steady state must be a stable equilibrium.9
Kawamoto (2009) also investigates the implications of status seeking behavior for
economic dynamics. He uses a model in which two-period living agents seek status
through relative income. The two types of status-seeking behavior (KUJ or RAJ)
result in totally dierent economy dynamics. If the marginal utility of an individ-
ual's own income rises as the average income rises, his preference is KUJ. If the
opposite is the case, it is RAJ. In a KUJ economy, any dierence in relative income
eventually disappears. In contrast, the relative position of one of the two types
goes to zero in an RAJ economy. Kawamoto (2009) emphasizes the importance of
attitudes in a reference point change (KUJ or RAJ), which decides whether the
steady state is equal or unequal. However, a kink in status utility also makes the
equal steady state stable. In other words, Kawamoto (2009) emphasizes the role of
parameter . Although in this model,  (and ) aect the long-run distribution of
wealth in a symmetric case, they do not play a signicant role in the asymmetric
case.
In Kawamoto (2009), the relative positions of both types in steady states will
be quite extreme, in the sense that high-type agents hold all of the world's assets
or both types eventually hold the same amount of assets. However, in this paper,
the only steady states are those in which both types possess a positive portion of
the world's assets.10
Now, I show how the inequality dynamics would change with parameters.
9Further, note that there is a parameter set under which there exist two stable steady states
(and one unstable steady state). If this is the case, an initial inequality in an economy determines
which equilibrium the economy converges to.
10Kawamoto (2009) shows that there exist steady states where both types hold a positive
portion of the world's assets in an economy where KUJ and RAJ agents coexist. However, here
too, dierent attitudes to change in the benchmark decide the nature of the steady state.
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@@1
	(yt+1; 1; 2; ) =   2=
(1 + (yt+1))2
@(yt+1; 1; 2; )
1
< 0; (18)
@
@2
	(yt+1; 1; 2; ) =   2=
(1 + (yt+1))2
@(yt+1; 1; 2; )
2
> 0; (19)
@
@
	(yt+1; 1; 2; ) =   2=
(1 + (yt+1))2
@(yt+1; 1; 2; )

> 0: (20)
Because a rise in 1 means an increase in the utility premium, the high-type
agents want to accumulate capital to obtain the premium. Hence, inequality in
the economy tends to expand. The opposite argument is valid for a change in 2.
The same logic, as in section 3.2, applies for the interpretation of parameter .
5 Dynamics of Inequality and Output
5.1 Joint Determination of Inequality and Output
In the previous section, I show how the dynamics of inequality are aected by the
status utility parameters. In particular, the existence of a kink determines the sta-
bility of an equal steady state. In this section, I turn to the joint determination of
inequality and output in the long-run. Further, I investigate capital accumulation
in the transition path and the eect of a redistribution policy. It will be seen that
the kink in status utility not only aects the dynamics of inequality, but changes
the transition of output. Furthermore, due to the kink, inequality becomes intri-
cately correlated with the level of output. In this section, I focus on the cases
wherein the unequal steady state is stable (1 > 2). Summing the equations of
(8), I get the dynamics of capital accumulation as follows:
bt =
bt+1
2A
f(yt+1); (21)
where f(yt+1)  2 +  11 (yt+1) +  12 (2  yt+1):
From (16), (17), and (21), the phase diagram can be depicted as in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows that any economy with an arbitrary initial condition will con-
verge to a unique steady state. Depending on parameter , somewhat dierent
phase diagrams are described. The bt = 0 line is described as
bt = bt+1   bt = 0,
b1 t =
2A
f(yt+1)
:
When  > 1, the b = 0-locus is hump-shaped as shown in the left panel of
Figure 4. On the other hand, when   1, it is an upward curve (see the right
panel of Figure 4). The shape of bt = 0 is explained as follows.
11 The key
to understand is the force of Joneses preference to equality. A KUJ preference
11In the Appendix, the shape of b = 0 is mathematically investigated.
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Fig. 4: Phase diagram:  > 1 (left);   1 (right)
( > 1) is dened as a status preference wherein an increase in the reference level
raises the marginal utility from status. This eect diers for unequal agents: the
eect on poorer agents is stronger.12 This causes the economy to be equal. On
the other hand, with an RAJ preference ( < 1), both agents will be less willing
to bequeath as the reference level rises. However, the eect on poorer agents is
stronger than richer ones. Figure 4 (right) shows it graphically. As the social
average bt increases, the dierence between the two groups expands (high yt).
Next, consider the case of  > 1. The opposite logic seems to apply: a higher
inequality is now associated with a lower output. An increase in the average raises
both types' incentive for accumulation, but the incentive of the low-type agents is
higher. As such, the bt = 0-locus should be decreasing. However, a kink has an
adverse eect. When 1 > 2, the high-type agents have a higher marginal utility
of bequest. Consequently, a rise in the social average may have a bigger eect on
the high-type agents. This results in the increase in bt = 0 (see the left panel
of Figure 4). According to this observation, the correlation between inequality
and output is not monotonic and is complex. With a small inequality (lower y), a
positive relationship arises. However, when inequality is high (larger y), a positive
or negative relation may appear. Depending on inequality, the correlation would
change. There are empirical studies that regress the growth rate on inequality.
They have not provided a conclusive correlation between the two, and suggest
that both directions of the correlation seem possible. This paper allows for both
possibilities.
Next, I explore how a change in status parameter changes the level of output
in the steady state. It will be seen that stronger motive for status may or may not
lead to greater output.13 The steady state in this economy is characterized by the
12The reason for this is the dierent responses in the agents' marginal utility of status due to
a change in the average level (see Kawamoto (2009)).
13Liu and Turnovsky (2005) uses a standard representative agent model to show that con-
sumption externalities cause excessive long-run capital accumulation. However, employing a
continuous-time overlapping generations model, Fisher and Heijdra (2009) show that the reverse
is true. Moreover, Wendner (2010) uses a continuous-time overlapping generations model with
age-dependent productivity and shows that the eect of conspicuous consumption on output is
11
following equations;
y =
1 

(1  (y)) + 2
1 + (y)
; (22)
where (y) =
2  y +  11 (2  y)
y +  12 (y)
;
and
(b)1  =
2A
2 +  11 (y) + 
 1
2 (2  y)
 2A
f(y)
: (23)
Certainly the long-run levels of inequality and output depend on the nature of
status preference (1, 2 and ). Thus inequality and output are jointly determined
in this model, and the dierent attitudes in status preference change the relation-
ship between the two. Using a Ramsey model with innitely-lived heterogeneous
consumers, Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008) investigate the implications of
status seeking behavior in consumption. They nd that the level of output in the
steady state is independent of the properties of status preference, unlike in this
model.
I now consider changes in the strength for status seeking to see the eect on
the output level in the steady state:
@f(y)
@1
=   1
21
(y)| {z }
direct eect (negative)
+
@y
@1|{z}
positive
[ 11 (y
) 1    12 (2  y) 1]| {z }
positive/negative| {z }
indirect eect through inequality
: (24)
Note that an increase in f(y) implies a decrease in the output level in the
steady state, and vice versa (see (23)). There are two eects on output as the
strength of status preference (1 or 2) changes. Consider a rise in 1 as an
example. First, the direct eect of the change is an increase in the motivation
of high-type agents for accumulation. This results in a higher level of output in
the steady state. In turn, the indirect eect is due to a change in inequality, and
thus, a status seeking behavior. I observe that an increase in 1, that is, a higher
utility premium, results in more inequality in the economy. This alters the capital
accumulation of households through status seeking. Whether this eect is positive
or negative is not clear and depends on the parameters, especially . When   1,
more inequality is associated with higher output. As such, more inequality because
of a rise in the utility premium raises output. Based on this observation, a rise in
1 increases the steady-state level of output via both direct and indirect eects.
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5.2 Redistribution Policy
Now, I turn to the eect of a redistribution policy. I consider two types of redis-
tributive policies (one-time redistribution and inheritance tax). The conventional
ambiguous.
14When   1, the square bracket term in equation(24) is negative. Hence, @f(y)=@1 < 0,
and thus @b=@1 > 0
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view for redistribution concerns fairness in a society. However, the by-products of
such a policy need to be specied and a number of previous researches address this.
That is, the implemented policy may decrease the economic pie (output). First, I
focus on a particular form of redistribution policy. Suppose that the economy is
initially in the steady state and some level of wealth is redistributed from the rich
to the poor. At the date of policy implementation, the economy jumps to A from
E in Figure 4. In Figure 4, the redistribution policy results in the same qualitative
consequence. On the path to the steady state, the capital level of the economy
declines rst and then gradually regains. Therefore aggregate capital decreases
due to such a redistribution policy, as does the output.15 The intuition underlying
this transition is straightforward. The direct impact of the policy is the changes
in the wealth of both high-type and low-type agents. Although low-type agents
accumulate more assets for their children, high-type agents become less willing to
do so. When 1 > 2, the negative eect of high-type agents exceeds the positive
eect.
Next, I introduce a redistributive policy (inheritance tax) such that a pro-
portion of the bequeath is collected by the government as tax and the revenue
is redistributed among citizens. The budget constraints of households and the
government become
cit + b
i
t+1  wt + (1 + rt)[bit(1  ) + Tt];
Tt =
1
2
(bHt + b
L
t );
where  and Tt indicate the tax rate and lump-sum transfer, respectively. Note
that the levying of tax does not distort resource allocation. The tax system purely
makes some transfers from the rich to the poor.
The inequality dynamics are derived in the same manner and one can obtain
yt =
1 +
  [1  (yt+1)] + 2
1 + (yt+1)
 	(yt+1; ):
As Compared to the no-tax case, the function 	() shifts up, as the tax rate
increases. By introducing inheritance tax, inequality tends to diminish, as ex-
pected. The long-run level of capital accumulation is unchanged and determined
by (23). Despite no distortion by tax, such a policy may increase or decrease out-
put through status seeking behavior. The property of status seeking determines
which case will arise.
6 Conclusion
I have shown that whether inequality in an economy will persist may depend on
the \direction" of the kink in status utility. The status utility that Barnett et al.
15Consider the case wherein  > 1 and 1 = 2 (no utility premium). Now, the bt = 0 line is
decreasing. In this case, the one-time redistribution increases the output level at implementation.
Because of a kink in status utility, the transition to the steady state changes.
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(2009) assume, interpreted as one wherein there is a utility premium exceeding the
social average, leads to an inequality-persistent steady state. This is because richer
agents try to inhibit poorer ones from going beyond the social average, although
both types want to do so. In contrast, following the empirical study of Vendrik
and Woltjer (2007), a no-inequality steady state must be stable and the economy
is likely to move to it.
The model used in this paper is quite simple for tractability. One of the sim-
plifying assumptions is that there are only two types of agents. Although this
simplies the analysis, an emergence of a third type of agent generally plays an
important role in an economic model. For example, consider the behavior of the
middle class in a model with utility premium. The decision of the middle class on
going beyond the social average aects aggregate capital accumulation and thereby
inuences the behaviors of other agents through status seeking. Furthermore, the
literature on status preference typically models economies without social mobility,
although status seeking behavior seems to represent competition among agents.
Incorporating these ingredients is left for the future work.
Appendix
Shape of f(y)
In this section, I examine function f(y), when 1 > 2. (see equation (23)), I
check the following statements.
 when  > 1, f(y) is U-shaped, and then b = 0 is hump-shaped.
 when   1, f(y) is decreasing, and then b = 0 is increasing.
First, taking the derivatives of f(y), I obtain
f(y)  2 +  11 y +  12 (2  y); (A.1)
f 0(y) = [ 11 y
 1    12 (2  y) 1]; (A.2)
f 00(y) = (   1)[ 11 y 2 +  12 (2  y) 2]: (A.3)
Now consider the two cases.
Case 1:  > 1 (
f 0(1) = [ 11    12 ] < 0;
f 0(2) =  11 2
 1 > 0:
(A.4)
I thus have
f 00() > 0: (A.5)
Therefore, when  > 1, the function is entirely convex and starts with a
negative slope at y = 1, and ends with a positive slope (see Figure 5).
Because f(y) is concave, b = 0 is convex as in the left panel of Figure 4.
In case 1, if 1 = 2, function f(y) is monotonically increasing. Hence, the
negative slope at y = 1 is due to the kink in status utility.
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f(y) f(y)
y y
1 12 2
Case 1:  > 1 Case 2:  < 1
Fig. A. 1: Shape of f(y)
Case 2:  < 1 (
f 0(1) = [ 11    12 ] < 0;
f 0(2) =  1: (A.6)
I thus have
f 00() < 0: (A.7)
In case 2, the function is concave and decreasing in y. I thus obtain an upward
slope of bt = 0 as in the right panel of Figure 5.
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